

LIMITATION OF LAND ARMAMENTS

by

DAVID WOODWARD

with the aid of the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

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THE BURDEN OF ARMAMENTS

RECENT events have focussed so much attention upon naval disarmament or limitation that the public is apt to overlook the fact that for nearly all the nations of the world land armaments have a greater importance than navies. Of sixty nations

listed in the *Armaments Year Book*, only two—Great Britain and Japan—spend more on their navies than on their armies. The navy, army and air estimates for 1928-1929 of the five powers represented at the London Naval Conference are as follows:¹

	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Army</i>	<i>Air Service</i>	<i>Total</i>
U. S. A.	\$336,673,000	\$379,539,000	\$56,772,000	\$772,984,000
Great Britain	275,040,000	197,040,000	78,000,000	550,080,000
France	98,048,000	259,508,000	(2)	357,556,000
Italy	57,589,100	132,781,400 ⁽³⁾	30,725,500	221,096,000
Japan	112,114,360	103,761,776	(2)	215,876,136

In the course of an article⁴ which appeared in the London *Economist* of October 19, 1929, it was stated that the world is at present spending the equivalent of \$4,300,000,000 annually on armaments.

"Europe as a whole," Mr. Jacobsen says, "spends annually on armaments £524 million (13,230 million gold francs), or £40-£45 million more than in 1913, in spite of reductions in the armaments of certain countries under the terms of the peace treaties. If the amounts spent by Germany are deducted, the totals for the other countries are:—Pre-war, £386 million; post-war, £487 million. These figures mean that European countries other than Germany devote to armaments almost as much in real values (account being taken of the rise in prices) as they did before the war, and considerably more than their average expenditure in the period 1909-1913. In

order to bring the armaments of those countries down to the level obtaining in 1908 there would have to be an average reduction of approximately 30 per cent from the level of 1928.

"The present world expenditure on armaments shown in the various national budgets is something like £890 million (22,390 million gold francs) per annum, of which 60 per cent. is expended by European countries, about 20 per cent. by the United States, and 20 per cent. by the rest of the world. But if account is taken of the fact that the extra-budgetary charges resulting from compulsory military service, strategic railways, etc., are considerably higher in Europe than in the United States, it is probably fair to say that of the world's real outlay on armaments two-thirds are expended by Europe, one-sixth by the United States, and one-sixth by the rest of the world. Compare with these data the fact that the income of 120 million inhabitants in the United States, estimated at a total of \$80,000 million, is about as large as that of the 480 million inhabitants of Europe, and considerably higher than that of the rest of the world. The United States, with about 35 per cent. of the income of the world, accounts for under 17 per cent. of the world's armaments

1. Based on figures given in League of Nations, *Armaments Year Book, 1928-1929*, C.374.M.120, Geneva, 1929.

2. Included in other figures.

3. Includes military grants-in-aid from the colonies.

4. Compiled by Mr. P. Jacobsen, formerly a member of the Economic Section of the Secretariat of the League of Nations, and now Secretary General to the Economic Defense Council of Sweden.

expenditure, while Europe, with a similar income, is responsible for 66 per cent. . . .

"It will be seen that the United States of America and Australia spend only about 1 per cent. of their national income on armaments, or less than any European country, whether disarmed under the terms of the Peace Treaties or otherwise. If full data were available, it would probably be found that Europe as a whole spent on armaments at least 3 per cent. and perhaps not far from 4 per cent. of its aggregate income. If Europe devoted to armaments the same percentage of its aggregate income as the United States of America, it would be spending, not at the rate of £524 million as at present, but something like £160 million. That would mean universal reduction to the level of armaments now obtaining in Switzerland or Austria, or, in other words, the elimination of all aggressive elements in the defence organisations of European countries."

In the same article a list is given of the amounts spent on armaments by some of the principal countries of the world, as follows:

EXPENDITURES ON ARMAMENTS

(In millions of gold francs)

Argentina	310	Japan	1,215
Australia	151	Jugoslavia	243
Austria	66	Latvia	43
Belgium	94	Lithuania	21
Bolivia	16	Luxemburg	1
Brazil	374	Mexico	235
Bulgaria	55	Netherlands	196
Canada	93	New Zealand	25
Chile	133	Nicaragua	1
China	536	Norway	59
Colombia	20	Panama	0.4
Costa Rica	4	Paraguay	5
Cuba	67	Peru	39
Czechoslovakia	281	Poland	369
Denmark	63	Portugal	113
Estonia	28	Rumania	214
Finland	82	Salvador	10
France	2,286	South Africa	25
Germany	942	Spain	786
Great Britain	2,900	Sweden	214
Greece	147	Switzerland	88
Guatemala	8	Turkey	196
Honduras	5	Uruguay	47
Hungary	101	U.S.S.R.	2,440
India	1,069	U. S. A.	4,553
Irish Free State ..	76	Venezuela	14
Italy	1,333	Grand Total ..	22,392.4

Not only do the majority of nations spend more on land armaments than on navies, but it is also true that armies absorb a greater number of men than do navies. The personnel of the five great navies totals 379,000;

first-line military forces employed by the five powers, however, number approximately 1,684,500 men.

In the course of his Armistice Day speech in 1929 Mr. Hoover said:

"The world today is comparatively at peace. The outlook for a peaceable future is more bright than for half a century past. . . . Yet after all it is an armed peace. The men under arms, including active reserves in the world, are almost 30,000,000 in number, or nearly 10,000,000 more than before the Great War."

Of these 30,000,000 it is estimated by the United States War Department that 6,000,000 are actively under arms.⁵

The armies maintained by the principal powers of the world today are as follows:⁶

The Armies of the Principal Powers

NON-CONSCRIPT ARMIES

Country	First Line	Militia, Reserves, etc.
British Empire ⁷	344,450	586,415
United States of America	133,081	283,617 ⁸
Germany	100,000	None

CONSCRIPT ARMIES⁹

France	607,533
Russia	562,000 ¹⁰
Italy	364,570
Poland	253,824
Japan	198,800
Rumania	185,726
Switzerland	156,070
Czechoslovakia	127,012
Spain	113,439 ¹¹
Jugoslavia	108,595

5. "The Disarmament Deadlock," F. P. A., *Information Service*. Vol. IV, No. 19, November 23, 1928.

6. Based on figures given in *Armaments Year Book, 1928-1929* cited.

7. These totals are made up as follows:

Country	First Line	Militia, Reserves, etc.
Great Britain	153,516	314,537
Australia	1,750	51,669
Canada	3,758	126,774
India	169,707	35,715
Irish Free State	18,896	30,000*
New Zealand	513	21,209
Union of South Africa	1,310	6,511

* In process of organization; cf. Lieut.-Col. E. G. Hart, "The Irish Free State Army," *Army Quarterly*, October 1928 and January 1929.

8. Of these, 163,793 are in the National Guard and 114,824 in the Officers' Reserve Corps.

9. Reserves immediately mobilizable may be calculated at approximately 2½ to 2¾ times the number of first-line troops (cf. p. 30, footnote 69), while the total number of trained reserves available is approximately six times the peace-time strength.

10. A most interesting and up-to-date account of the Russian army, written by one of the foremost French military critics, Lieut.-Col. Reboul, appeared in *Le Temps* (Paris), February 21, 1930.

11. Exclusive of police, civil guard, and security corps.

LEADING MILITARY SYSTEMS

The armies of civilized nations may be constituted by either one of two methods, as indicated in the foregoing table; they may be comprised of a limited number of men who volunteer to serve as soldiers for a period of years, or they may be formed by means of conscription or compulsory service—a system under which all fit male members of the community, other than those debarred for various reasons,¹² are required to undergo, generally at the age of 21, one or more years' military service and on their return to civil life may be called up from time to time to undergo "refresher" training courses, the length and frequency of these courses varying with the age of the conscript. After a certain number of years, liability to military service is finally discharged. The following table shows the duration of service with the colors, and the total duration of liability to service (i.e., the period during which men may be called up) in the principal conscript armies:

	<i>Duration of Service</i>	<i>Total duration of liability to service</i>
Belgium	8-14 months	25 years
Czechoslovakia	14 months	30 "
France	18 months ¹³	28 "
Italy	18 months	19 "
Japan	2 years	23 " ¹⁴
Jugoslavia'	18 months	29 "
Poland	24-25 months	29 "
Spain	2 years ¹⁵	18 "
Switzerland	42-92 days ¹⁶	28 "
U.S.S.R.	2-4 years	21 "

It is the difference between long-service and conscript armies which is the basis of the most important of all problems which have yet arisen in disarmament discussions. It is a comparatively easy matter for peace-time effective strengths to be limited, but non-conscript nations point out that the posses-

sion of large numbers of trained reservists gives any nation a great advantage when it comes to mobilizable strength. The theme of the difference between peace effectives in men and material and the potential level to which these factors may be raised in time of war is one which will continually recur in a consideration of this question and full discussion of it is reserved till later.

A factor which is generally neglected in assessing the relative values of conscript and long-service armies is the number of men in either type of army who are still recruits or only half-trained. It is easy to see that these elements must be very much higher in an army composed of men who for the most part serve together for only one or two years than in a professional army, where only about a twelfth part of the personnel is renewed each year. In order to reduce the number of men in the primary stages of training in conscript armies, the "class" (i.e., those reaching the designated age for military service in any year) is called up in two groups at six-month intervals.

The ranks of the conscripts are stiffened by a proportion of professional soldiers, who furnish officers, non-commissioned officers and other instructors for the training of the annual contingents of conscripts. They also serve as cadres for the expansion of the army upon mobilization.

CONSCRIPT VS. LONG-SERVICE ARMIES

Conscription, by reason of its cheapness, has found very wide favor. Under this system the governments enforce service and the rates of pay are purely nominal, whereas long-service volunteers have to be paid an attractive wage. The system of continually passing men through the ranks and relegating them to the reserve as soon as they are trained provides strong reinforcements for the serving armies; on the other hand, a long-service army provides a very small reserve force, for at the end of his period of service the retiring regular may be well on in middle life. Finally, the bringing together of men from all parts of the country to serve it together, side by side, has a unifying tendency among populations which might otherwise be divided by great distances or by barriers of nature.

12. E. g., in Italy, those sentenced in accordance with the common criminal code to a penalty *ipso jure* involving forfeiture of civil rights for life, or who have incurred forfeiture of these rights in addition to such sentence, are debarred from military service (*Armaments Year Book, 1928-1929*, cited, p. 509).

13. In process of being reduced to 12 months (cf. p. 24, footnote 31).

14. In Japan approximately a quarter of the annual contingent of those liable for conscription are selected for service by lot.

15. May be reduced to 18 months, the remaining 6 months being spent on leave.

16. Cf. p. 24.

"It is claimed, for example, by the Italian government, and by Italians even of the most liberal outlook, that Italy, after her Risorgimento, was only welded into a single nation by the common service of all her subjects in the national forces."¹⁷

Many citizens of the nations employing conscription believe their system to be the apotheosis of democracy,¹⁸ and fear the development of the long-service army into a kind of Praetorian Guard, or body of professional soldiers in the pay of a dictator.¹⁹

It is only within the British Empire (with the exception of some of the Dominions) and in the United States and the nations whose armies have been limited by the treaties of peace concluded in 1919-1920 that the volunteer long-service system exists in armies that have pretensions to being called first class.²⁰ Supporters of this system maintain that as compensation for its disadvantages a long-service army is more efficient for its size, on account of the long years of training which it undergoes, and in time of mobilization reaches a state of readiness for war more quickly. The view has been expressed that

"a conscript army is inherently less ready for war than a professional army, and therefore more conducive to war. The explanation of this paradox is that the loss of time has to be made up by rapidity of mobilization in order not to be caught at a disadvantage. Now the mobilization of a vast citizen army is a process incapable of camouflage, and compels other nations to follow suit."²¹

Non-conscript nations object to conscription on the ground that it is wasteful industrially, inasmuch as every man must give a year or more of his life, just as he is becoming settled, to military pursuits which are of little use to him in civil life. They further claim that conscript armies are the basis of modern militarism.

There is a strong and growing feeling in military circles that conscription generally

has outlived its usefulness and that the future belongs to much smaller and more highly mechanized forces.

The chief reasons for this belief are admirably summarized by Major B. H. Denning in an essay which was awarded the Bertrand Stewart Memorial Prize by the British Army Council in 1929:

"(1. Modern automatic small-arm weapons can produce a great volume of fire and enable a few men to produce the effect formerly produced only by a large number of men.

"(2. The strength of an attack is now measured not by the number of bayonets that are placed in the front line, but by the degree to which the power of infantry, armoured forces and artillery can be brought to bear.

"(3. The creation of mechanised forces in large quantities has given military force greater mobility, and within limits a smaller mobile force is capable of performances equivalent to those of a larger immobile force.

"(4. The air weapon is developing every year. The rear organisations of large mass armies, upon which such armies rely for existence, are vulnerable to bombing attack, whereas those of smaller forces are less exposed.

"(5. If there is any chance of exposure to armoured forces, large unarmoured forces are a source of weakness.

"(6. The future possibilities of gas are as yet unknown. The use of gas may render it dangerous to place larger forces in the field than can be specially protected.

"(7. In the case of overseas expeditions, the invention of the long range submarine has made it desirable to reduce the shipping employed to a minimum. The smaller the army the less shipping required."²²

Again, in another work, tracing the growth of mechanization, Major Denning says:

"Mechanised forces are dependent for their efficiency upon long service, whereas conscript armies can only have short service."²³

In an article which appeared in *The Living Age*, moreover, General von Seeckt, former Commander of the *Reichswehr*, has recently declared:

"I foresee that military strategy in the future will consist in the use of small armies, highly trained and extremely mobile, which will be backed up by the air forces and by the development of the large scale offensive and defensive forces of the country."²⁴

17. P. J. N. Baker, *Disarmament*, London, The Hogarth Press, 1926, p. 39.

18. Conscription was first introduced in modern armies by Carnot in the French Revolutionary Wars. Cf. Col. J. F. C. Fuller in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Fourteenth Edition, Vol. 6, p. 283.

19. For this viewpoint cf. Meyer, "Das Wehrsystem der Demokratie," in *Zehn Jahre Deutsche Republik*, Berlin Zehndorf, Sieben Stäbe Verlag und Druckerei, 1928, p. 273.

20. In Brazil military service is made compulsory if voluntary enlistments are insufficient. In Cuba, service is compulsory in the event of war. Service in Luxemburg, Mexico and Salvador is voluntary.

21. Capt. B. H. Liddell-Hart, *The Remaking of Modern Armies*, Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1928, p. 239.

22. Cf. *Army Quarterly* (London), July 1929, p. 235 et seq.

23. *The Future of the British Army*, H. F. and A. Witherby, London, 1928, p. 56.

24. *The Living Age*, November 1929; cf. also von Seeckt, *Gedanken eines Soldaten*, Berlin, Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1929.

The large scale offensive and defensive forces of the community referred to by General von Seeckt comprise a big militia which will supply, after a period of advanced training, a strong defensive force and replacements for the first-line army. General von Seeckt pointed out that it is financially impossible to equip a large conscript army with the most up-to-date weapons.

It will be of interest at this point to observe the organization of the leading armies of the two systems; the French and Swiss armies typifying two varieties of conscription, and the American and British armies exemplifying modern long-service armies.

CONSCRIPT ARMIES: FRANCE

France, invaded three times within a century by the same foe, twice defeated and on the third occasion achieving victory only with the help of strong foreign allies, is anxious to consolidate the position of paramount power which it has won on the continent.

Accordingly it has sought to insure the permanent weakness of Germany by the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles²⁵ and by gathering about itself, as its allies, those nations which also would have much to lose were the Central Powers to regain their old ascendancy. It has further sought to defend itself against Germany by the construction of fortifications for the protection of the newly won frontier, and by maintaining the largest army and air service in the world and a navy sufficiently large to guarantee communications with the vast reservoirs of men and material in North and West Africa.

Every effort is being made toward the perfection of a peace-time system of national organization against the coming of the next war, so that preparations which had to be hurriedly, inefficiently and expensively made during the course of the Great War will not have to be resorted to again, having this time been organized during the period of peace.

Many Frenchmen see in Germany a vast and rich country with a much greater European population, with superior industrial resources, specially well equipped in respect of

chemical warfare, and a superb system of railway communications, designed to forward most expeditiously the deployment of an army on the western frontier.

Without considerably larger fighting forces, France will always be in a position of inferiority as compared with Germany, and the memory of the three disastrous German invasions of 1814, 1870 and 1914 will not permit France to allow German military power to approach anywhere near its own so long as it can prevent it. As has already been explained, one of the mainstays of the French defensive system is conscription, for by its means France is able to maintain the great numerical superiority of its army over that of Germany.²⁶

FRENCH DEFENSIVE MEASURES

In March 1927, the French Chamber of Deputies passed a national defense act of a far-reaching character,²⁸ which throws an interesting light on French ideas concerning the next war. The bill provided in its essence for the mobilization of the whole nation in the event of another war. It enacted that "all persons of French nationality or subject to French law, irrespective of age and sex, and all legally constituted corporate bodies are bound . . . to take part either as combatants in the defense of the country or as non-combatants in the maintenance of its material or moral life."

The bill further entrusted to the government the regulation and control of all means

26. The cost of this would be prohibitive were France to maintain a voluntary long-service army on the plan of Great Britain or the United States.

On the other hand, as indicated above, some of the leading military critics are in revolt against this doctrine of numbers upon which France still relies. Captain Liddell-Hart, in a series of articles on the training and organization of the French army, says: "My own conviction is that a smaller professional army, well paid, highly trained and mechanised, would by its quality give France more real security than her present quantity affords. I would go farther and say that far from being a militarist menace, as is the delusion of ignorant foreign pacifists, France to-day has hardly adequate cover in her military insurance policy and this security is fast sinking to danger point." (Liddell-Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 276.)

In this connection, cf. an interesting article which appeared in the *Journal de Genève* for January 17, 1930, in which the Paris correspondent of that paper describes how the French army is being transformed into a militia by the shortening of the periods of service, and how, at the same time, opposition from certain quarters, largely among schoolmasters and members of the clergy, is being aroused against militarism in general and conscription in particular. The writer of the article considers that these very different factors are tending to transform the French army into a professional force.

28. For text and discussion, cf. *Annales de l'Assemblée Nationale, Sénat, Débats*, Vol. 108, No. 5, February 1928, p. 127-128; 132-156; 160-175; 179-198; 203-218; 222-243.

25. Cf. p. 26.

of transport; all questions relating to supplies for the armed forces, and for the general needs of the country; all modifications in the legal relationships of citizens *inter se* and with the State; direction of the intellectual resources of the country in the interests of national defense; and all steps to keep up the morale of the country.

When the bill was before the Senate nearly a year later, the provisions for the conscription of financial and industrial resources were deleted, but other measures considered necessary for national security in the next war remained unchanged. It will be seen that all, or nearly all, of these provisions came into force in the belligerent countries during the late war; this bill would simply save time for France if an emergency should arise again.

As a further measure of security the French Chamber authorized in 1928 the construction of a line of forts from the North Sea to the Alps, designed to hold the newly regained provinces of Alsace and Lorraine and to replace the fortifications rendered obsolete by recent advances in the art of war.

The scheme includes the construction of redoubts, forts and dug-outs, linked by a comprehensive system of light railways, roads and underground telegraph and telephone lines. It is to be merged with the old system, which will be modernized as far as possible.²⁹

Although the French army is, at the present time, the largest in the world, it represents a very considerable reduction in numbers from pre-war times:³⁰

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FRENCH ARMY		
	1913	1928
Establishment	947,000	666,000
Infantry divisions	44	25
Cavalry divisions	10	5
Field guns	2,800	1,300
Heavy guns and howitzers	250	1,000

The decreased establishment is largely due to a reduction in the term of service from three years to eighteen months.³¹

29. It will be remembered that the existence of the strong line of fortifications between Verdun and Belfort was the cause of the German decision to violate the neutrality of Belgium by a flank march through that territory rather than by risking a frontal attack on the fortified line itself.

30. Given by General Bernard Serrigny, Secretary of the Committee of National Defense and former Deputy Chief of General Staff, in his article on the French army in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Fourteenth Edition, Vol. IX, p. 592.

31. This is to be reduced to twelve months by November 1930. For full details and for the scheme of reorganization at present under way, cf. France, Chambre de Députés, April

THE SWISS ARMY

The system of Switzerland is peculiar to that country and merits attention as an alternative method of forming a conscript army, since by reason of the short period of service and the very small permanent staff it requires, it has a less disorganizing effect on the economic life of the nation than the system already described. The Swiss army is organized on a militia basis, and the only permanent effectives are officers and instructional cadres.

Instead of being called up for a year or more, recruits do from 60 to 90 days' training, while troops of the active army are called up annually for from 11 to 14 days' training, according to their ranks and to the arm of the service to which they belong.

Arms and equipment issued to soldiers on joining usually remain in their possession after the expiration of their period of service, and finally become the property of those men who show their ability to take care of them after they leave the army.

The total period of liability to service is from the age of 20 to 48. In 1928 the effectives of the Swiss army were as follows:

SWISS ARMY

Training staff	289
Cadres training	7,852
Recruits training	24,800
Men called up for "refresher" courses	123,129

NON-CONSCRIPT ARMIES: THE UNITED STATES

The army of the United States comprises the regular army, the National Guard and the organized reserves. The strengths of these forces stood, on June 30, 1928, at the following figures:

THE UNITED STATES ARMY

Active or Regular Army	136,081 ³²
National Guard	181,221 ³³
Organized Reserves	119,834 ³⁴

8, 1927, *Rapport sur l'organisation générale de l'armée*, No. 4355. The reduction will be effected when the number of professional soldiers has been raised from 70,000 to 106,000 (including 30,000 in the colonial army), and when sufficient military officials, civil employees and Republican Guards have been recruited to permit of their taking the place of soldiers at present occupied by these auxiliary duties.

32. The regular army is organized in divisions of an establishment of 10,932 infantry and 5,189 cavalry.

33. The National Guard is composed of citizens who perform weekly drills, and may attend camp for a fortnight in the summer.

34. The organized reserves are largely formed from retired war-time officers. To keep up the strength there exists the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, recruited in schools and

The major missions assigned to the regular army are described briefly in the *Armaments Year Book* as follows:

"(1) To provide adequate personnel for the development and training of the National Guard and the organised reserves and for furnishing a trained stiffening component for the organisation of higher units for battle service;

"(2) To provide the necessary personnel for the *overhead* of the Army of the United States, wherein the duties are of a continuing nature;

"(3) To provide an adequate organised, balanced, and effective domestic force, which shall be available for emergencies within the continental limits of the United States or elsewhere, and which will serve as a model for the organisation, discipline and training for the National Guard and the organised reserves.

"(4) To provide adequate peace garrisons for the coast defense within the continental limits of the United States:

"(5) To provide adequate garrisons in peace and war for overseas possessions."³⁵

GREAT BRITAIN

In Great Britain the regular army is recruited upon the long-service principle, the normal period of service being twelve years,

of which three to ten years may be in the reserve.

The purposes of the regular army are to provide an expeditionary force at home, the proportion of white troops required for duty with the Indian Army, the garrisons of various bases upon the lines of naval communication³⁶ and garrisons of special territories.

In addition to the regular army there exists the Territorial Army, recruited by voluntary enlistment for a period of four years, re-engagement being permitted for a term of from one to four years. Recruits perform from 20 to 45 one-hour drills, take a recruit course in musketry and spend a period of 8 to 15 days' training in camp; thereafter members are required to perform annually 10 to 20 drills, take a further musketry course and spend a period in camp.

The Army Estimates for 1930-1931 totalled £40,500,000—a reduction of £605,000 compared with the preceding year and a reduction of £4,000,000 compared with 1925-1926.³⁷

The establishments of the British Army for the year 1928-1929 were:

THE BRITISH ARMY

British troops (regimental) exclusive of those in India	139,052
Colonial and native Indian troops used outside of India	2,778
Army Reserve	109,000
Supplementary Reserve (including permanent staff)	22,085
Militia (Channel Islands)	1,326
Militia (Malta and Bermuda)	1,423
Territorial Army (including permanent staff)	183,500
Officers' Training Corps (Officers and permanent staff)	1,245
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Total exclusive of India	460,409
British troops (regimental) on Indian establishment	60,044
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Total	520,453 ³⁸

The strength of the military forces of the Dominions are shown in the table on p. 20. They consist largely of small training cadres and territorial or militia units.

colleges—the government furnishing instruction, material and money and the Citizens' Military Training Camps, where for a few weeks during the year young men may have military training if they desire it.

35. *Armaments Year Book*, 1928-1929, cited, p. 850.

36. At the present time garrisons are maintained at Gibraltar, Malta, Singapore, Hong Kong, Aden, Jamaica, Bermuda, Ceylon, Sierra Leone, Mauritius, and in Egypt, Palestine, the Sudan, China and Iraq (Royal Air Force only).

37. In the course of the debate on the Estimates for 1929-1930 in the House of Commons, Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, then Secretary of State for War, said these figures represented a reduction in the effective vote of 11 per cent for the last

The Indian army comprises both native and British troops.

The foregoing account of the differences of organization and of the various special

four years. Comparable figures in respect of other countries showed that in the same period the United States had increased this expenditure from £51,000,000 in 1925-1926 to £59,000,000 in 1928-1929; Italy from £18,000,000 in 1925-1926 to about £28,000,000 in 1928-1929; Germany from £20,000,000 in 1925-1926 to £25,000,000 in 1928-1929; and France from £34,000,000 in 1925 to about £58,000,000 in 1929. Russia showed an increase in its total armament expenditure of over £40,000,000 (out of a total of £84,000,000) since 1924-1926, while figures for Belgium, Switzerland and Japan also showed increases; Sir Laming said that during this period Britain was the only nation that had continuously reduced expenditure on its army. (Cf. *The Times*, London, March 1, 1929.)

38. Effectives on January 1, 1928 totalled 449,602.

features which exist among some of the armies of the world gives an idea of the difficulty of evolving a scheme whereby one army may be reckoned against another for purposes of comparison and equitable limitation.³⁹

AIR FORCES

The air forces of the nations are, as a general rule, integral parts of their armies and navies; in Great Britain, Italy and Sweden, and to some extent in France⁴⁰ the Air Force is constituted as an entirely independent arm, ranking with the Army and Navy.

COMPULSORY DISARMAMENT

The treaties of peace signed with the Central Powers at Versailles, Neuilly, Trianon and St. Germain may be taken as the beginning of post-war disarmament. In the first place the Covenant of the League of Nations is incorporated as a preamble in each one of these treaties,⁴² and in the second place each of them imposes stringent limitations upon the fighting forces of the defeated nations.

The disarmament clauses of these treaties are of great technical interest. The military section of the Versailles Treaty was drawn up under the immediate supervision of Marshal Foch and Sir Henry Wilson,⁴³ and were intended to be as efficient from the military

It is a matter of extreme difficulty to obtain accurate statistics concerning the strength of the air services of the various powers, but, according to an unofficial statement issued by the Air League of the British Empire,⁴¹ the figures for the five great naval powers are at present as follows:

SERVICE AIRCRAFT ^{41a}			
	<i>First line</i>	<i>Reserve</i>	<i>Total</i>
France	1,730	3,000	4,730
United States	1,463	350	1,823
Italy	840	800	1,640
Great Britain	772	520	1,292
Japan	572	not known	572

point of view as possible. Everything has been done to make the treaty "cast iron" and to render its clauses unequivocal. Professor Baker has called it "... as nearly perfect an attempt to limit by treaty the strength of a given country as could be made."⁴⁴

Although the Treaties of Neuilly, Trianon and St. Germain granted the three countries concerned a larger freedom of internal organization than was permitted to Germany, all four of the peace treaties are drawn up on the same general lines and it will be sufficient for present purposes to outline the military provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.

The German army is limited to 100,000 of all ranks.⁴⁵ It is to be recruited solely on a voluntary long-service basis, thus preventing the formation of large forces of trained reserves by quickly passing men through the ranks, as was done subsequent to the limitation of the Prussian army by Napoleon after the battle of Jena. The possibility of the formation of cadres by means of surplus officers is prevented by laying down a proportion of one officer to twenty-five men; further, the Great General Staff is abolished and the lines upon which the German army is to be organized are strictly regulated. Territorial, militia or reserve forces of any kind are forbidden, while no semi-official or

39. As a supplement to their long-service armies, there exists in the United States, in Great Britain and in some conscript countries a species of militia (termed Territorial Army in England and National Guard in the United States), that is to say, part-time citizen soldiers who get their training in the time they can spare from their civilian pursuits, and who exercise together at infrequent intervals. To some extent these forces counterbalance the vast superiority in trained reserves possessed by conscript armies. It is obvious that these troops are by no means of the same value at the outbreak of war as regular or conscript soldiers, but at the same time the experience of the last war showed plainly that they can be of considerable value after some weeks of advanced training. It is reckoned by most military critics that it takes nine months to train the average fit man to be a soldier, while it was found by the British in the World War that after four months of intensive training the Territorial Force was able to take its place in the front line with the regular units.

Some nations, notably Spain and Italy, maintain a large well-trained and well-armed gendarmerie, which is capable of immediate incorporation in the ranks of the regular army. The Italian *carabinieri*, for instance, comprising gendarmerie, the former Royal Guard of Public Safety and customs officers, number some 60,000 men. The *carabinieri* were so organized and trained that it was possible to use them in the last war side by side with the regular units.

40. The combatant air forces of France are under the direction of the Air Ministry, though reconnaissance air regiments and air groups are placed under the War Ministry for tactical purposes.

41. Cf. *Daily Telegraph* (London), January 20, 1930.

41a. Cf. also *Aviation*, March 22, 1930, p. 601.

42. Cf. p. 28.

43. Then Chief of the British Imperial General Staff.

44. Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

45. In the three other treaties the corresponding limitation is as follows: for Austria 30,000; for Bulgaria 20,000; for Hungary 35,000.

private organization may concern itself with military matters.

Moreover, the number and kind of weapons to be used in the German army, together with their reserve stocks of ammunition, are regulated in proportions which are by no means generous.⁴⁶ Tanks, armored cars, military aircraft, guns and howitzers of a calibre exceeding 77 and 105 mm. respectively are forbidden, except when already mounted in fortifications. Fortifications on the western frontier have been dismantled in accordance with the terms of the treaty requiring the establishment of a demilitarized zone 50 kilometres wide on the eastern bank of the Rhine. Fortifications on the southern and eastern frontiers may be maintained in their original state, but the calibre and number of their guns must not be increased and their ammunition supply is restricted.

In the Treaty of Versailles, however, there are two important omissions, which in the light of later events are seen to have been of great importance. The first is that there is no provision in the treaty for a definite proportion of non-commissioned officers to men, with the result that the ratio of non-commissioned officers to men in the German army is at present about 1 to 4.25, whereas, when this oversight was rectified in the treaties of Trianon, Neuilly and St. Germain, the proportion was fixed at 1 to 15.

The second omission was the failure to provide for any form of limitation of the amount of money which might be spent on armaments. This being the only form of expansion left (e.g., through the use of better quality material, the offer of higher pay to attract a better class of men, and through more intensive research and experimental work), the cost of the German fighting forces has risen disproportionately to their size, and today Germany is spending on its army of 100,000 men 40 per cent of what it spent on its army of 842,000 in 1913.⁴⁷

In all four countries, trade in arms and war material was absolutely forbidden. Only the number of weapons and the supplies of

ammunition necessary to maintain the permitted establishments might be manufactured, and the manufacture was to be carried out in certain specified factories; all other arsenals were dismantled.

In the factories permitted, only the minimum plant required for the manufacture of the small annual supply of ammunition might be retained. Export or import of any kind of war material was forbidden.

ENFORCEMENT MEASURES

Finally, the peace treaties attempted to prevent evasion of their disarmament provisions by establishing inter-Allied Commissions of Control, which were granted wide powers of inspection and regulation in the ex-enemy States.⁴⁸ Moreover, in Article 213 of the Versailles Treaty it was further provided that Germany would give "every facility for any investigation which the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority vote, may consider necessary."

The work of the inter-Allied Commission of Control aroused such ill-will in Germany that, following the Ruhr occupation of 1923, the commission's activity had to be suspended entirely.⁴⁹ It was not until June 1924 that the German government finally agreed that it should be resumed, but only as a step toward supervision by the League. The Allies finally agreed to the abolition of all inter-Allied Commissions of Control, provided the system of control by the League Council was substituted for it. In 1925 the Council organized a plan whereby it was provided that a commission of inquiry might be sent to any of the four countries subject to inter-Allied control upon the demand of any State Member of the League. Such a commission might take any steps necessary to satisfy itself in respect of the question whether or not the Central Powers are living up to the disarmament provisions imposed in the peace treaty.⁵⁰

Following the establishment of the League plan of control, the inter-Allied system was withdrawn from Germany in January 1927,

48. Treaty of Versailles, Articles 203-212.

49. For details, cf. R. L. Buell, *International Relations* (revised edition), New York, Henry Holt, 1929, p. 566.

50. Cf. League of Nations, *Minutes of the Thirty-third Session of the Council*, p. 609; *Rules on the Exercise of the Rights of Investigation* (C.729.1926.XI); and *Official Journal*, October 1924, p. 1592.

46. It is provided that the establishments of armaments for the German army may be altered by the League Council upon Germany's admission to the League of Nations (cf. Article 164), but no change in this connection has been made since Germany entered the League.

47. *The Economist* (London), cited, October 19, 1929.

from Hungary in May 1927, from Bulgaria in June 1927, and from Austria in February 1928.

From the political standpoint a doubt has been expressed whether it is desirable for

the League Council to attempt to supervise disarmament in respect of the countries defeated in the World War without undertaking the same duties in respect of the Members of the League generally.

THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE TOWARD DISARMAMENT

It would, of course, simplify the problem of disarmament if treaties like that of Versailles could be extended to cover the armaments of every nation, but at present there exist difficulties well nigh insuperable in the way of such a course of procedure. Every nation would have to abolish conscription, and forswear the use of such modern weapons as aircraft, tanks and heavy artillery. Every nation would also have to accept the principle of League supervision of its armaments. It seems obvious that there are few nations in the world which at present are willing voluntarily to accept such drastic limitations.⁵¹

Two articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations foreshadow attempts on the part of League members to reduce military establishments by international agreement. Article 8 reads in part as follows:

"The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

"The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several governments."

Article 9 provides that:

"A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles 1⁵² and 8 and on military, naval and air questions generally."

51. The attitude of the majority of powers toward conscription renders even the first step impossible at the present time. It is well known that it was only at the urgent request of the British government that the post-war German army was established on a long-service voluntary basis. France and the other Allies feared that this provision might prove to be the thin end of a wedge directed against compulsory service in other countries, and would have much preferred a German conscript army. (Cf. H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, London, Henry Frowde, 1920, Vol. II, p. 128-29.) France proposed at Versailles that the strength of the German army should be fixed at 200,000, recruited on the basis of universal compulsory service. This was subsequently altered at the desire of Mr. Lloyd George to a voluntary long-service army, and the strength was accordingly set at 100,000.

52. The relevant part of this article reads: "Any . . . State . . . may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided

In discussing the limits which were placed on German and other ex-enemy armaments, the Allied and Associated Powers made it clear that they did not consider the famous preamble to the disarmament clauses of the peace treaties⁵³ to be mere words, and definitely stated that:

"The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their requirements in regard to German armaments were not made solely with the object of rendering it impossible to resume her policy of military aggression. They are also the first steps towards that general reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war and which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote."

PERMANENT ADVISORY COMMISSION

In accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the League quoted above, and in fulfilment of the pledge given to Germany and its associates when they signed the peace treaties, the Council of the League, sitting at Rome, appointed in May 1920 a Permanent Advisory Commission, composed exclusively of soldiers, sailors and airmen, to investigate the possibilities of disarmament.

To this commission there was submitted a series of questions bearing upon disarmament, for the most part asking for definitions, and designed to find out from the experts their opinion of the best way to carry out the general disarmament scheme envisaged by the Covenant.

On almost every question the commission reported negatively,⁵⁴ and those who had

that it . . . shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments." (No such conditions for League membership have as yet been prescribed. Cf. Manley O. Hudson, "Membership in the League of Nations," *American Journal of International Law*, July 1924.)

53. "In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany (Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria) undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow."

54. For Report of the Permanent Advisory Commission, cf. League of Nations, *Records of the First Assembly, Meetings of Committees*, Vol. II, Annex I, p. 311-18.

foreseen that to leave the matter solely in the hands of the fighting men themselves was to court disaster indulged in a great deal of criticism. That fighting men would not willingly give up their life-work was the comment most often heard, but in reality the trouble lay deeper than this. The fighting man's first duty was to insure the safety of his country, and the members of the commission were naturally inclined to consider every question in this light. Consequently, since peace was so recently established,⁵⁵ they were extremely careful as to what they promised. In the early stages of the work of the commission there appeared a factor which speedily resolved itself into the cardinal principle underlying every effort at disarmament: that of security. More and more it came to be realized that, insecure as the state of all Europe was, the powers preferred to trust in their armaments until such a time as they could be reasonably certain not only that their rivals and neighbors would disarm proportionately to themselves but also that there would be some real guarantee of effective action against an international wrongdoer. This, the general view of the continental powers, was opposed by Great Britain and the United States, which held that security would follow disarmament of its own accord.

TEMPORARY MIXED COMMISSION

Following upon the initial failure of the first League commission on disarmament, the First Assembly of the League in February 1921, under the leadership of Lord Cecil, set up another commission, organized on different lines (November-December 1920).⁵⁶ This body, called the Temporary Mixed Commission,⁵⁷ was composed of six (later increased to twelve) politicians, six military, naval and air experts and four financial and economic experts, while three members representing labor and three representing employers were chosen by the Governing Body of the International Labour

Office.⁵⁸ The Temporary Mixed Commission was dissolved by the Fifth Assembly and replaced by a "Coordination Committee," to which was entrusted the solution of the technical problems of disarmament; but, largely owing to the failure of the Geneva Protocol to secure ratification, nothing was accomplished by this commission.⁵⁹

PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

Accordingly, the Sixth Assembly resolved in September 1925 to make an entirely new start and replaced a Council Committee, which had been appointed in the previous December, with the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, which is the League organ for disarmament existing today. Between May 1926 and the present day, the Preparatory Commission has held six sessions, the first in May, the second in September 1926, the third in March and April, and the fourth in November and December 1927, the fifth in March 1928, and the sixth (first part only) in April and May 1929.

This commission has set up a Committee on Arbitration and Security to deal with the political considerations which occupied the attention of its predecessors, while technical questions were confided to two sub-commissions—Sub-Commission A, dealing with military, naval and air matters, and Sub-Commission B, dealing with non-military matters referred to it by Sub-Commission A.⁶⁰

In the course of the third session of the Preparatory Commission, preliminary draft conventions, based on the report of Sub-Commission A, were submitted by Viscount Cecil on behalf of Great Britain, and by the French delegation.⁶¹ The texts of the two drafts revealed such wide discrepancies that it was thought best to adjourn the commission until the differences had been made the subject of private negotiation. Except for

58. This commission prepared a Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (League of Nations, Records of the Fourth Assembly, *Minutes of the Third Committee*, p. 197), upon which were founded the ill-fated Geneva Protocol and the Locarno Pact. Cf. Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

59. *Ibid.* "If the Geneva Protocol had been carried into effect, a disarmament conference would have been summoned within a short delay."

60. A detailed account of the work and difficulties of this commission may be found in "The Disarmament Deadlock," F. P. A. *Information Service*, Vol. IV, No. 19, November 23, 1928.

61. Cf. League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, *Minutes of the Third Session*, p. 358-416.

55. As a matter of fact, while the Permanent Advisory Commission was sitting, Russia was at war with Poland, there were two civil war campaigns being conducted in the former country, Turkey was preparing to eject the Greeks from Asia Minor and Germany was by no means satisfactorily disarmed.

56. Cf. League of Nations, *Official Journal*, March, April, 1921, p. 143-51.

57. Cf. League of Nations, *Resolution 3 of First Assembly*, Council Document 124, 1920.

the abortive Anglo-French agreement,⁶² nothing was done in this respect, while the fourth and fifth sessions of the Preparatory Commission proved also to be barren of results. Nevertheless, the League Assembly requested that work be recommenced; accordingly a sixth session was called, at which was begun the second reading of a draft convention based on the earlier French and British drafts. The discussion was eventually adjourned, however, to permit the naval powers to settle their disputes outside the League. There was sufficient agreement on military and air questions to permit the Preparatory Commission to draft the text of an agreement on these points.⁶³

PLANS FOR DIRECT LIMITATION

During the six sessions of the Preparatory Commission a number of methods of limitation and reduction were proposed which may be roughly classified under two general headings, (a) direct and (b) indirect limitation.⁶⁴

LORD ESHER'S PLAN

Perhaps the simplest method of limitation is to limit definitely the number of men in each army of the world. Lord Esher proposed such a plan to the Temporary Mixed Commission in 1922.⁶⁵ This merits description in detail, for it is the most comprehensive yet put forward. It provided for the reduction, on a numerical basis, of the "metropolitan" forces (those stationed in the home-country), but excluded colonial troops entirely, on the ground that the colonial powers were in the minority and should be permitted to look after their own requirements. Further, he included only effective peace strengths, and neglected trained reservists and territorial forces entirely, for the following reason, as explained by Lord Robert Cecil in the 1922 report of the Temporary Mixed Commission:⁶⁷

62. "The Disarmament Deadlock," cited.

63. League of Nations, Preparatory Commission on the Disarmament Conference, *Minutes of the Sixth Session*, p. 222.

64. For the lengthy report of Sub-Commission A, cf. League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, *Report of Sub-Commission A (Military, Naval and Air)*, Geneva, 1926.

65. Viscount Esher (1852-1930) was president of the Territorial Force Association and a permanent member of the Committee of Imperial Defense.

67. League of Nations, Records of the Third Assembly, *Minutes of the Third Commission, Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission*, p. 69.

"In all questions connected with the reduction of armaments, it is essential to keep clearly in mind the distinction between the periods into which a war, which resulted from an act of aggression occurring after a general and mutual reduction of armaments, would be divided. The first period, which may be called Period A, would be that in which each of the belligerents would put into the field only those forces which it had been able, under its reduction agreement, to prepare in time of peace. The second period, which may be called Period B, would be that in which steps would be taken to put into the field forces mobilized and trained after the outbreak of war. The first period would probably be of a few months' duration; the second would begin with the entry of the first war-trained troops, and would continue until each belligerent had mobilized its full national strength."

Lord Esher was of the opinion that it was impossible in any case to lay down definite rules concerning the limitation of forces effective after the end of Period A. Further, he considered that under the general conditions of security afforded by the League, it was only Period A that mattered, as by the end of that time the provisions of Article XVI of the Covenant would be enforced. It has recently been said⁶⁸ that this may mean a larger peace establishment, since an aggressor will endeavor to act as speedily as possible in order to confront the League of Nations with a *fait accompli*.

Finally, experts believe that there is a definite limit to the expansion which is possible on mobilization of any conscript army, because of the limited power of a cadre to provide for the supply of new formations on immediate notice, however well organized it may previously have been. Serving soldiers are handicapped by the adulteration of their ranks by too many reservists who, for the time being at least, are by no means as efficient as those serving at the commencement of mobilization.⁶⁹

For similar reasons, Lord Esher did not propose any limitation of the material with which armies were to be equipped, for he believed that while Period B need not be considered at all, during Period A the combatants would be able to dispose only of a certain limited amount of weapons and ammunition.

68. Cf. *Journal des Débats*, February 3, 1930, p. 227.

69. "... None of these general staffs, when hostilities broke out, could place in the field more than two and three-quarter times the number of troops they had maintained in time of peace." P. J. N. Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

The numerical basis of the plan was the allocation to each of the powers of a certain number of units of 30,000 soldiers, including air force personnel, while complete liberty was accorded to the powers to organize their forces in the manner best calculated to satisfy their own needs. France, as the largest military power, was to have had 6 units, Italy and Poland 4 each, while Great Britain, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Greece, the Netherlands, Rumania and Spain were to have had 3 apiece.⁷⁰

Lord Esher's scheme has been described in detail because it is by far the most comprehensive put forward to date, and because, taken with the criticisms of it made by the Temporary Mixed Commission, it sheds a great deal of light on various aspects of the disarmament question. Criticisms of the scheme were chiefly based on the ground that it had not gone far enough.

The commission admitted that "it would be absurd to limit 'the effort made by a nation should it carry out a national mobilisation.'"⁷¹ But its members did not agree that in limiting peace strength it was sufficient to limit the size of standing armies without considering other factors, such as material and industrial resources. They also decided against the omission of reserves and territorial and colonial forces in estimating the military strength of a nation.

On the other hand, the Temporary Mixed Commission put forward no constructive criticism and certain other proposals of Lord Esher received no consideration at all.

THE RUSSIAN PROPOSALS

Another proposal for the direct limitation of effectives was made to the Preparatory Commission by the Soviet government in December 1927.⁷² This plan called for the disbandment of all armies, navies and air forces. Nevertheless, it proposed among other things that "the maintenance of a protective and police service, the personnel of which shall be engaged by voluntary con-

tracts of service, shall be authorised in the territory of each of the contracting States, for the purpose of Customs and revenue police supervision, internal police and the protection of State and private property." It was also suggested that a maritime police service should be organized to protect the natural products of the sea, and to suppress piracy and the slave trade.⁷³

These proposals having failed of acceptance, the Soviet government in the spring of 1929 proposed reduction of armaments on the basis of the amounts possessed by each nation on a fixed date. This plan provided that the strongest powers should reduce their armaments by 50 per cent, the medium powers by 33 per cent and the weaker powers by 25 per cent.⁷⁴

The adoption of this proposal would have meant that France, the strongest military power, would have had to reduce to a larger extent than the smaller powers. For this and other reasons the Russian proposal was not accepted.

TRAINED RESERVES

A difficulty underlying all of these proposals to limit the size of armies is the difference between conscript and voluntary long-service armies already discussed.⁷⁵ Governments of countries having the voluntary system at first wished to insist that, in any plan for the limitation of the size of armies, trained reserves produced by the conscription system should be counted as part of the military strength of a country, and that they should be taken into consideration when comparing the strength of such a country with that of a country having the voluntary system. France, however, has vigorously declined to accept this suggestion.

One means of solving the difficulty would be to abolish conscription—a measure which was actually proposed by the Chinese delegation at the sixth session of the Prepara-

70. The other units were assigned as follows: Belgium, 2; Denmark, 2; Norway, 2; Portugal, 1; Sweden, 2; Switzerland, 2. The forces of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary were to remain as defined by the treaties of peace.

71. From a speech of M. Sato, before the Sixth Commission. Cf. League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, *Minutes of the Sixth Session*, p. 24.

72. Cf. League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, *Minutes of the Fifth Session* (1928), p. 324.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 329. Señor Salvador de Madariaga asserts that the Soviet government could afford to offer such a drastic disarmament proposal because Russia's foreign policy consists in the spreading of Communism by propaganda, and reduced armaments in other countries would facilitate the success of such propaganda abroad. (S. de Madariaga, *Disarmament*, New York, Coward-McCann, 1928, p. 60.)

74. League of Nations, *Monthly Summary*, May 15, 1929, p. 133.

75. Cf. p. 21.

tory Commission.⁷⁶ Naturally this proposal did not meet with the favor of any nation having the conscription system.

To break the deadlock, the British government in the Anglo-French draft accord of 1928 agreed to surrender its position on the question of reserves in return for naval concessions by France.⁷⁷ And in April 1929 Lord Cushendun declared to the Preparatory Commission that Great Britain would not insist upon the inclusion of trained reserves. In the same month Ambassador Gibson declared that the United States was "disposed to defer to the views of the majority of those countries whose land forces constitute their chief military interest."⁷⁸

Count Bernstorff, the German representative, repeated his country's request, meanwhile, that trained reserves be included in the convention, but expressly stated that Germany did not ask for any general abolition of compulsory military service. Count Bernstorff laid before the commission a compromise proposal, whereby the value of trained reserves was to be determined on a sliding scale, based upon the age and length of service of the reservist and the length of time that had elapsed since he had last received military training.⁷⁹

At the 1929 Assembly the British government, now controlled by the Labour party, introduced proposals which were generally interpreted as an attempt to reopen the trained reserves question.⁸⁰

Even though trained reserves are not limited, it is still possible for nations employing the conscription system to agree to restrict the term of military service—to one year, for instance—or to limit the number of recruits annually called to the colors. As between nations having conscript armies, such a method of limitation would be effective. But the problem would still remain of evaluating the relative strength of conscript armies thus limited and armies recruited upon a voluntary basis. If trained

reserves are excluded from these calculations, Germany and the other powers which are bound by treaty not to employ the conscription system would feel themselves at a disadvantage, even though professional voluntary armies are much more efficient, man for man, than conscript armies.

WAR MATERIAL

In addition to the direct limitation of effectives, the direct limitation of war material has also been proposed. Germany and Russia have both suggested that supplies of weapons, such as machine guns, tanks and field guns, both in service and in reserve, as well as ammunition, be definitely limited.⁸¹

Those who suggested this type of limitation recognized that the term "war material" is extremely hard to define.^{81a} A gun is war material, but what of the tractor, indistinguishable from the peace-time vehicle, necessary to place it in position? A tent may be war material, but what of the bedding, or of the soldiers' clothing? Limits may be agreed upon for war-stocks maintained in peace time, and two countries may have equal supplies; but when war breaks out the country with a superior industrial organization will soon be in a position of very definite superiority. Then, again, there are such adjuncts to modern commerce as motor lorries, locomotive engines and rolling stock, which are built in large numbers in time of peace without thought of war, but when war comes these are chartered or commandeered to maintain the services essential to the efficiency of the fighting forces.

There are few industries that are not convertible to the manufacture of articles of war of some description. Chemical factories manufacture poison gas, motor car factories make aeroplane engines and tanks,⁸² while shipyards build the hulls and machinery of war vessels.

INDIRECT LIMITATION

A favorite suggestion of pre-war days, and one which has subsequently been con-

76. Proposal of General Tsiang Tsoping, cf. League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, *Minutes of the Sixth Session*, p. 123-24, and Annex 3, p. 206.

77. Cf. "The Disarmament Deadlock," cited, p. 390 ff.

78. League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, *Minutes of the Sixth Session*, p. 114.

79. League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, *Minutes of the Sixth Session*, p. 203-05.

80. League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 75, Records of the Tenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, *Plenary Meetings, Text of the Debates*, p. 159-62.

81. League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, *Minutes of the Sixth Session*, p. 160-61.

81a. Cf. speech by M. Massigli (France), *Ibid.*, p. 170.

82. An interesting example of this is given by Capt. B. H. Liddell-Hart in describing a new type of one-man tank successfully tested by the Royal Tank Corps. "This one-man tank was, I discovered, built of ordinary car components. The military authorities would merely have to supply the armour and machine guns, obtain the track from a commercial tractor company and any civil motor firm could turn the machines out in mass production by the thousand at a cost of less than £400 apiece." (*The Remaking of Modern Armies*, p. 63.)

sidered by the Assembly of the League,⁸³ is that of "budgetary limitation"; that is to say, a proposal that the contracting powers should agree to spend only a limited amount of money per year on their fighting services, being permitted, however, to allocate the sum in any manner they choose.

In the text prepared by the French delegation for the Draft Disarmament Convention at the third session of the Preparatory Commission, provision was made that the total annual expenditure upon military forces should not exceed the figures in the convention approved by the several contracting States.⁸⁴

To this the British, Italian and Japanese delegations entered a reservation to the effect that they believed publicity to be the best guarantee of budgetary limitation, while the delegations of the United States and Germany made a general reservation to the inclusion in the Draft Convention (i.e., in the texts drawn up at the first reading) of any limitation of budgetary expenditure whatever.

Mr. Hugh Gibson, the United States representative, said: "My Government is strongly of the opinion that monetary expenditure for the creation and maintenance of armaments does not afford either a true measure of armaments or a fair basis for the limitation of armaments. It holds this opinion for the following reasons.

"First, the direct and indirect costs of personnel under the conscription and voluntary systems are so variable in different countries and in their overseas possessions,

and are influenced by so many different factors, that these costs are practically impossible of simple and equitable conversion to a common basis.

"Second, due to differences in rates of pay, in production costs, in maintenance charges, in costs of labour and material; due also to varying standards of living and to variations in rates of exchange and to lack of uniformity in the preparation of budgets, any attempt to apply this method of limitation would, in our opinion, be unfair and inequitable. . . .

"For these reasons, my Government is firmly of the opinion that any method of limitation of armaments based upon the limitation of budgetary expenditure is impracticable, inequitable and hence inadmissible."⁸⁵

Further, during the second reading of the Draft Convention, in April 1929, Mr. Gibson advanced the argument that limitation of budgetary expenditure would be unconstitutional.⁸⁶

Supporters of budgetary limitation on the basis of the *status quo* point out that if it had not met with objections it would have had the effect of preventing an increase in armaments costs in spite of the complicated factors referred to by Mr. Hugh Gibson in his speech at the sixth session. (See above.) How manifest a benefit this would have been, they say, may be seen by comparing the defense budgets of the principal powers for 1928-1929 with those for 1925-1926. These were as follows:⁸⁷

TOTAL ARMS EXPENDITURES			Percentage of Increase or Decrease
	1925-1926	1928-1929	
United States	\$528,701,000	\$658,000,000	+ 24%
Great Britain	£127,231,000	£117,210,000	- 8%
France	5,586.6* million francs	9,451.6** million francs	+ 50%
Russia	436.5† million roubles	813.3†† million roubles	+ 84%
Japan	443.8 million yen	490.7 million yen	+ 27%
Italy	4,735 million lire	4,761 million lire	+ 1%

* 1925.

† 1924-1925.

** 1928.

†† 1927-1928.

83. The First and Second Assemblies of the League called for acceptance by League Members of an undertaking not to exceed for two years the total sums provided in their current budgets for armaments. (Cf. League of Nations, Proceedings of the First Assembly, *Plenary Meetings*, p. 534 and, for a summary of replies, J. W. Wheeler-Bennett: *The Reduction of Armaments*, London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1925, p. 36-44.)

84. League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, *Minutes of the Third Session*, p. 407.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 178.

86. *Ibid.*, *Minutes of the Sixth Session*, p. 175.

87. *Armaments Year Book, 1927-1928*, cited, *passim*.

Had the principle of budgetary limitation been in force in 1925-1926, it would have prevented increases in the military appropriations of all the above powers except those of Great Britain, which show a decrease.

After France had stated that it would not press the matter of budgetary limitation, it was eventually decided to hold the matter over till the session resumed after its adjournment, while it was agreed that the principle of publicity in regard to armaments should receive the widest possible support.

CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF DISARMAMENT

France and its associates have expressed their disbelief in the utility of any scheme of disarmament—especially in regard to limitation of material—which does not provide for an effective international system of investigation and control for the purpose of bringing to light infringements of the proposed disarmament treaty.

In the preliminary draft convention submitted by the French delegation,⁸⁸ provision was made for the appointment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission, to whose attention any State could bring circumstances which it believed materially affected its security. By a two-thirds vote, the commission might decide to investigate such circumstances; but in this and in any subsequent vote, the parties to the dispute would be excluded, though they might be represented at all discussions of the situation. The commission might decide to conduct the examination upon the basis of documentary evidence only, or it might consider whether the allegations required an inquiry on the spot.

In the course of the discussions in Sub-Commission A, French delegates and others associated with them reiterated their view and stated that, while they were not qualified to enter into any details, they were convinced that it would be possible to draw up some kind of agreement for the supervision

and control which they believed to be so necessary.⁸⁹

Great Britain and the United States, however, opposed the suggestion, contending that the best assurance that the treaty would be kept was the good-will of the contracting parties.^{89a} Lord Cushendun, the British representative, expressed skepticism as to the possibility of his country's receiving such a commission of control as had been proposed and proceeded to argue that, since international control was impossible, a limitation of material was also impracticable, however desirable it might be theoretically. He based his opinion on the dangers which would arise should one country, probably unofficially and through the more popular and less responsible organs of the press, accuse a neighbor, with whom its relations at that time were strained, of secretly increasing its armaments.⁹⁰

THE ALLOTMENT OF RATIOS

The foregoing outline of the issues involved in direct and indirect limitation of armaments indicates the complexity of the task which will face the Disarmament Conference when it is finally convened. But methods of limitation will not be the only problems the conference will have to face; for once the methods of limitation have been agreed upon, there will still remain the most delicate question of all to settle—viz., that of armament ratios, or the number of effectives, of weapons and their ammunition and of other articles of war which each nation will be permitted to have. The Preparatory Commission has had nothing to do with this question of ratios, its task having been simply to formulate lines upon which limitation may be established. As already indicated,

89. *Report of Sub-Commission A*, cited, p. 171. Cf. also Articles 7 and 8 of the Geneva Protocol, League of Nations, Records of the Fifth Assembly, *Plenary Meetings*, Appendix 30A, p. 498.

89a. Great Britain suggested an alternative on the basis of Article XI of the Covenant, giving the powers the "friendly right" of bringing before an international body any violation of the treaty or any changes in armaments likely to disturb international relations, and providing that the signatory powers should agree to co-operate in any inquiries found desirable—provided that none should be made in the territory of a signatory State without its consent. (Cf. Cmd. 2,888—1927 League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, 3rd Session, March 21-April 26. Report of the British Delegation to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1927, H. M. Stationery Office, London.)

88. League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, *Minutes of the Third Session*, p. 361.

90. League of Nations, Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, *Minutes of the Sixth Session*, p. 175.

however, it will be the function of the general disarmament conference to determine these ratios.

The task may prove even more difficult than that of determining the basis of limitation. Suppose, for example, that the Preparatory Commission finally agrees that the number of men in each army should be limited. The next problem would then be to determine the actual number of men which the armies of France, Italy, Germany and other powers might have respectively. At present, as already seen, France has an army of about 600,000 in comparison with 100,000 for Germany and 365,000 for Italy. The simplest method of limitation would be to sign a treaty providing for the continuance of the relative *status quo*; but obviously

such a treaty would sanction the continued military superiority of France, and it would in all probability be opposed by the other powers. Just as the United States has demanded "parity" with Great Britain as the fundamental condition of a naval limitation treaty, so Germany and Italy may demand "parity" with France as a fundamental condition for a military limitation agreement. There is reason to believe, therefore, that a treaty providing for the limitation or reduction of land armaments will depend upon the willingness of France to renounce or at least reduce its present military superiority over the other powers.⁹¹ France asserts that this can be done only after the question of "security" is solved. This subject may be discussed in a future *Information Service* report.

⁹¹ France has also asked that the "war potential" of each power be taken into consideration in determining size of armaments. This is defined as "the maximum military strength which each power could develop measured by the maximum armed force and the maximum equipment of all kinds which,

in the course of a prolonged war, and with every facility for thorough preparation it would be able to throw into action." (Baker, cited, p. 256). The inclusion of this formula has been opposed by the United States and other governments, partly on the ground that this factor is incapable of measurement.

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